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A RECONSIDERATION OF THE PHYSICIANS' IMMUNITY STATUTE
The author assesses the "physicians' immunity statute" from legal policy, ethical, and
financial perspectives, and concludes that alternatives such as licensure and monetary
incentives would better serve the goal of encouraging invention more effectively by
rewarding it.
INTRODUCTION
¶1
In a controversial case, a physician, Samuel Pallin, sued another physician, Jack
Singer for infringing a patent that Pallin received for a single stitch cataract surgery
technique.1 Believing that such patents were inappropriate, Singer fought the lawsuit and moved
for summary judgment declaring the patent invalid.2 While the court denied Singer's summary
judgment motion, the court did invalidate some of Pallin's patent claims at trial.3 Because Singer
demonstrated to the court that Singer had performed the procedure one month before Pallin filed
his patent application, the court partially invalidated Pallin's patent, and Pallin agreed not to
enforce his remaining valid claims against Singer.4
¶2
In response to the Pallin case, Representative Greg Ganske and other physicians in
Congress sought to limit the ability of a patentee to enforce his rights against a practicing
physician. They supported their position by citing a patient's restricted access to care, the higher
costs of health care caused by patent royalties, and the duty of physicians to share knowledge
with others. They took the position that patents are unnecessary to advance medicine, and cited
other countries' prohibitions on medical procedure patents.5 Although the initial attempt to
protect practicing physicians was unsuccessful, Congress eventually chose to protect physicians
and health care facilities from patent infringement liability if they performed a medical
procedure on the human body that does not involve patented machines, patented matter, or valid
biotechnology patents.6 This statute, more commonly known as the "physicians' immunity
statute," states that:
[w]ith respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical

practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity.7
¶3
The following paper examines the statute's implications from a legal, ethical, and
health insurance perspective and suggests a possible alternative to the current regime.
LEGAL POLICY ANALYSIS
¶4
While the physicians' immunity statute laudably seeks to increase access to patient
care at reduced cost, it conflicts with the policies underlying the patent system. The patent policy
of creating incentives to invent supports eliminating physicians' immunity for three reasons.
First, the elimination of all remedies for infringement destroys the incentive to invent. A
physician-inventor invests human capital and financial capital to perform routine health care
services. A physician often will notice problems or complications in the physician's field and
may discover a new way to eliminate these complications through routine practice. Routine
payments to physicians do not include a concurrent reward to improve the state of the art, and
inventors who labor trying to solve a modest complication receive no compensation for their
investments. Furthermore, many patented procedures require extensive clinical research that is
left uncompensated by the physicians' immunity statute.8 For example, Surrogate Embryo
Transfer (SET) technology required extensive clinical research to develop the technique for a
patent. Procedures like SET require private investment that only will be obtained by offering the
monopoly incentives protected by infringement remedies under the patent statute. While many
medical procedures with low capital investment still may find their way to the market, high
capital procedures require that protections afforded by infringement remedies for these
procedural innovations be offered to patients.9
¶5
In addition to the need to recover invested capital, the physicians' immunity statute
also differentiates the roles played by academic and commercial medicine by eliminating the
incentives for innovation in the private sector. In academic medical research, scientists obtain
funding through NIH grant applications, private donations, and technology transfers initiated
under the Bayh-Dole Act.10 Successful academic medical researchers have a strong incentive to
invent created by their dependence on outside funding while unsuccessful academic researchers
will face difficulties funding their projects. The inherent funding structure in academic research
partially alleviates the elimination of patent incentives caused by the physician immunity
statute. On the other hand, private physicians, who constitute the vast majority of practicing
physicians today, have no such incentives. They must rely on the commercial market to recover
their investments, which is a questionable assumption under the current structure of the

American health care system. This distinction created between academic and commercial
medicine prevents optimal use of the intellectual resources present in the medical community.
¶6
Although the physicians' immunity statute has limited the ability of doctors to enforce
a medical procedure patent, they have continued to file for these patents for the reputational
benefits associated with patent ownership. However, the enhanced reputational value created by
patent ownership will not allow a patentee to recover his or her investment, lowering the
incentive to invest in researching the new techniques in the first place. As such, unless the
physicians' immunity statute is changed, society can expect fewer medical procedure
innovations in the future as fewer physicians invest the time and money in research.
ETHICAL ANALYSIS
¶7
While the economic benefits of invention present the strongest arguments for patenting
medical procedures, the strongest arguments against patenting medical procedures derive from
the professional ethics of medicine. The American Medical Association ("AMA") requires a
physician not to withhold information for financial gain.11 The paradigm for a physician under
the medical ethics code is one of a "teacher who imparts knowledge of skills and techniques to
colleagues, and a student who constantly seeks to keep abreast of new medical
knowledge."12 However, the AMA's teacher-student paradigm is inconsistent with the realities
of education because it ignores that financial incentives envelop the teacher-student relationship
at all educational levels. Students pay teachers precisely because the teacher has invested high
amounts of capital to obtain their knowledge, and as such, are compensated financially for their
investment. Similarly, a physician-inventor could expect reasonable compensation for teaching
others as long as he does not withhold his knowledge for personal gain. Similarly,
student-physicians could expect to pay teacher-physicians for their expertise.
¶8
The AMA also argues that the physicians' immunity statute is necessary to avoid
undesirable secrecy among the medical professionals.13 According to the AMA, if physicians
can enforce their patents, they will be forced to keep their innovations secret. While secrecy is
inherently associated with the patent system, this argument overlooks the intrinsic procedures of
the patent system to encourage public disclosure. For example, to obtain a patent, the applicant
must disclose a written description detailing to one of skill in the art how to make and use the
invention. In addition, the patent system has a one-year grace period to file an application that
allows the applicant to disclose publicly the invention and still obtain a patent.14 As such,
information in the American patent system reaches the public as soon as the technique has been

perfected.
¶9
The AMA has another valid ethical concern supporting the physicians' immunity
statute: restricted access to patient care. If physicians must pay heavy licensing fees, they will
face an ethical conflict between their financial interests and the best interest of the
patient.15 Physicians may be deterred by the threat of liability every time they seek to modify or
use patented procedures.16 The patentee also may unreasonably limit the number of licensees or
charge unreasonable royalties that may make access to a lifesaving medical procedure
unavailable from a practical standpoint.17
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ANALYSIS
¶ 10
In the United States, health care is financed through three mechanisms: private
insurance, government insurance, and self-insurance. Private insurance companies, such as Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, offer a variety of insurance policies such as managed care or fee-for
service.18 Private insurance is most commonly provided by a person's employer although
individual plans are also available.19 These plans may provide a limited network of approved
providers to consumers.20 Government insurance comes from two publicly funded programs for
select populations, Medicare and Medicaid, which generally cover the elderly and the poor
respectively.21 Over 42 million Americans do not qualify for government insurance or receive
private insurance from their employers, and they collectively form the self-insured
population.22
¶ 11
The financial burden of paying patent royalties presents perhaps the strongest
objection to allowing recovery of patent royalties for infringing medical procedure patents.
Since both private insurance and government insurance have capped the amount that they will
spend for medical procedures, any extra royalty payment is likely to be passed onto
consumers through higher premiums. Such an increase in rates will likely adversely affect
enrollment or benefits because people will be unable to afford the higher costs. Moreover,
insurance companies may deny coverage of patented procedures until the patent's term expires,
forcing doctors to use less innovative techniques or absorb the royalty costs themselves. Finally,
insurers may choose to force the provider to bear the cost by maintaining payments under the
contract. The provider again will have a financial incentive to use less innovative techniques.
¶ 12
In addition to the financial burden presented by patent royalties, the distribution of
patent royalties also presents an objection to eliminating physicians' immunity. Allowing patent
royalties and infringement liability would harm those Americans who are self-insured because

they are unprotected from high medical costs by insurance price ceilings. Any patent royalty
would fall directly on the self-insured, an outcome that is inconsistent with medical public
policy requiring medical access to all.
¶ 13
On the other hand, the restricted consumer choice currently presented by health
insurance companies supports the elimination of the physicians' immunity statute. The limited
network of physicians that a patient under private insurance can choose inherently denies the
medical procedure patentee the benefit of his patent. If an inventor makes a better widget, he
will be able to market his improvements to the public, and once the public recognizes this
improvement, the patentee will be able to receive monopoly profits under his invention.
However, in the current system, a medical invention patentee is not guaranteed to receive higher
profits because consumers are not able to select the better procedure or physician. Consumers
are limited to the providers covered by their insurance contract, and a doctor must rely on his
reputation to receive referrals. While some consumers will request referral to the patentee,
insurance plans will force other consumers to seek treatment from physicians who are either not
licensed to practice the patent or unskilled in the new procedure. The restriction by insurance
companies of patients' ability to choose the patentee as their physician decreases the incentive
for the physician to invent under the patent system.
POTENTIAL REFORM TO PHYSICIAN IMMUNITY
¶ 14
As demonstrated above, the legal, ethical, and insurance arguments supporting the
physicians' immunity statute are mixed at best because the system fails to recognize the
necessity of allowing physicians to recover the investment they made in researching the
innovation. A better solution would be to allow a medical procedure patentee to recover his or
her investment by licensing the technology. Just as Congress created a zero dollar price tag for
infringement of a medical procedure patent under section 287(c)(1), Congress should have a
similar power to provide a limited remedy that does not preclude preserving patent incentives to
invent. If the physician refused to license a technology, Congress could create a nominal
damages provision allowing other physicians to use the procedure by paying small, nominal
damages.
¶ 15
Such a threat of nominal damages will not encourage significant litigation, should
encourage reasonable licensing agreements, and should offer a modest return on investment for a
procedure to the patentee. For an invention derived from everyday medical experience, a
nominal damages provision would preserve a small incentive to invent that should be the reward

for proper invention.
¶ 16
However, imposing nominal damages does not solve the larger question of whether
society should allow expensive procedures, such as SET, to obtain full patent protection to raise
capital or encourage private investment in research. A nominal damages provision will not
accomplish this goal even in the aggregate with large numbers of infringement actions or low
priced licenses. Several commentators have proposed a full patent damages provision for high
capital inventions that require investment for research, development, and regulatory
costs.23 While this type of provision encourages investment, the financing mechanisms and cost
control techniques of insurance companies will decrease access to these techniques for most
patients and further increase the burden on the self-insured population. A remedy for the
problems presented by these capital-intensive medical procedures comes down to a pure policy
choice between access and increasing innovation.
¶ 17
As a practical concern, removal of the physicians' immunity statute opens a potential
floodgate for litigation. Physicians may choose to enforce their patent rights vigorously and try
to use the patent to seek expensive licenses if full royalty remedies are restored. However, the
Pallin case teaches would-be claimants to act at their own peril because a medical procedure
patent may be invalidated through proper evidence.24 Proving infringement liability for
procedural patents is extremely difficult.25 Increased opportunities for litigation also may
encourage physicians to license their patent rights to large insurance companies who are better
equipped to engage in expensive litigation. This could drastically alter the current insurance
financing schemes and significantly decrease access to care. Any changes made to the physician
immunity statute must be carefully designed, and the need to encourage investment in medical
procedures may better be met by increased funding.26
CONCLUSION
¶ 18
The physicians' immunity statute responded to a public concern over the Pallin case
but may have been a hasty reaction to the problem. It became effective over the protest of
several prominent senators who objected to hasty passage of the legislation.27 It protects the
ethical concerns highlighted by health care professionals by protecting access to care and
physician autonomy. However, the statute places severe constraints on the ability to invent by
undervaluing human capital and private investment in medical research. The statute also
protects all insured parties from royalty costs and helps to alleviate the burden of the
self-insured. While these considerations are important, reconsideration of the elimination of

monetary incentives for research should be considered to protect the Constitutional foundation
of the patent system to promote science and the useful arts.28
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